






Penalty Default Rules for Digital Searches:  
Why Courts Should Spur Legislative Action 
via Second-Order Regulation 
Meghan Holloway† 
We live in a data-rich age. But Fourth Amendment doctrines have failed to 
adapt to our current reality. Legal principles that evolved to cabin the scope of phys-
ical searches seldom constrain searches of digital devices. As a result, a warrant to 
search a digital device gives police officers unfettered access to all of our information. 
While many scholars have argued that courts should address this problem by adopt-
ing rules that directly limit the scope of digital searches, this Comment argues that 
some courts have already eschewed this approach in favor of rules that encourage 
legislatures to regulate digital searches. Legislative regulation of digital searches is 
preferable because the legislative branch is better equipped to deal with a rapidly 
evolving technological landscape. Unfortunately, however, courts have not gone 
about incentivizing legislative action effectively. This Article posits that if courts 
want to encourage legislatures to act, they should adopt a penalty default rule that 
disadvantages the police. Specifically, courts should temporarily ban the plain view 
doctrine during searches of digital devices until legislatures limit the scope of digital 
searches. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Paul is the subject of an investigation into tax fraud. Law en-
forcement officials believe that he participated in a scheme that 
defrauded the government of a significant amount of money. As 
part of the investigation, officers obtain a warrant to search 
Paul’s home for evidence of this scheme. The warrant gives the 
officers the ability to search all of Paul’s electronic documents and 
files for evidence of the crime. When the officers arrive to execute 
the warrant, they copy all of the data from Paul’s laptops, exter-
nal hard drives, phones, and tablets. The copied devices contain 
all of Paul’s emails, phones, documents, text messages, and 
browsing history. The data show officers where Paul was on any 
given day, how long he spent looking at a given website, and what 
files he deleted. All of this information is taken to a police station 
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where forensic experts spend weeks looking through data from 
Paul’s devices. While the warrant only authorizes officers to look 
for evidence of tax fraud, the experts look at every file, photo, text, 
or website on that computer—even though evidence of tax fraud 
would likely be in a Word document or PDF. The officers find ev-
idence of Paul’s tax evasion, but they also find evidence that he 
illegally purchased marijuana and viewed pirated Game of 
Thrones episodes. This additional evidence results in new crimi-
nal charges.1 
Instinctually, the officers’ expansive search of Paul’s devices 
feels intrusive and unnecessarily invasive. Most Americans prob-
ably think that the Fourth Amendment should prevent officers 
from seizing all of a suspect’s data and rummaging through it for 
evidence of a crime. 
But while we may think that these police practices should be 
unconstitutional, that is not necessarily true. The Fourth Amend-
ment, as it has traditionally been applied to physical searches, 
does little to limit the scope of a search of a digital device.2 Con-
stitutional doctrines that limit the scope of physical searches have 
not effectively adapted to the rapid pace of technological change. 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence evolved to regulate searches of 
physical spaces, which can store only so much information. Digi-
tal devices, however, are able to contain amounts of data that 
would be impossible to casually store in an analog form. For ex-
ample, one terabyte of data is analogous to all the books in a 
twelve-story library.3 This storage capacity was inconceivable a 
generation ago. 4  Now, it is commonplace. Fourth Amendment 
doctrines that evolved to constrain the scope of a search of a  
house have not adapted to similarly constrain a search of digital 
libraries. 
Faced with this emerging problem, courts could take one of 
two regulatory approaches: (1) regulate police behavior by giving 
officers a set of rules to follow, or (2) issue decisions that 
 
 1 While Paul is fictional, this example is based on the facts of United States v  
Burgess, 576 F3d 1078, 1082–84 (10th Cir 2009) (upholding a conviction for child pornog-
raphy charges based on a search pursuant to a warrant for images of drug trafficking). 
 2 For a discussion of why the Fourth Amendment fails to effectively limit the scope 
of digital searches, see Part I.B. 
 3 See Paul Ohm, Response, Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power 
of Magistrate Judges, 97 Va L Rev Brief 1, 6 (2011). 
 4 See Orin S. Kerr, The Next Generation Communications Privacy Act, 162 U Pa L 
Rev 373, 391 (2014). 
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encourage the executive or legislative branches to address the 
problem.5 These two approaches are called first- and second-order 
regulations, respectively. 6  Most of the scholarship on digital 
searches has focused on how courts should reduce the scope of 
digital searches through first-order regulation. For example, com-
mentators have argued that magistrate judges should prescribe 
digital search procedures in a warrant,7 impose use restrictions 
on data, 8  and alter how warrant exceptions apply to digital 
searches.9 This Comment takes a different approach by focusing 
on the second type of judicial regulation: how courts can incentiv-
ize legislatures to regulate digital searches. 
First, this Comment shows that many federal courts have al-
ready eschewed first-order regulation in favor of encouraging leg-
islative action. However, I argue that courts are attempting to 
spur legislative action the wrong way. Specifically, judges have 
undercut their pleas for legislative intervention by crafting rules 
that reflect existing police practices.10 Regulators are not incen-
tivized to propose alternatives when the existing rules do little to 
change police behavior. But without some policymaking interven-
tion, the privacy-invasive status quo will persist: suspects like 
Paul will continue to experience intrusive digital searches that 
would be unconstitutional in other contexts. 
If courts really want to motivate legislative change, they will 
have to take more drastic steps by adopting penalty default rules. 
Penalty default rules are rules that disadvantage certain parties 
to encourage those parties or other third parties (in this case, 
 
 5 See John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 Cal L Rev 
205, 213–14 (2015). 
 6 Id. 
 7 See Emily Berman, Digital Searches, the Fourth Amendment, and the Magistrates’ 
Revolt, 68 Emory L J 49, 82–93 (2018); Ohm, Response, 97 Va L Rev Brief at 11–12 (cited 
in note 3). But see generally Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and 
Seizure, 96 Va L Rev 1241 (2010) (arguing that imposition of such procedures by magis-
trate judges is unconstitutional and unwise). 
 8 See generally Orin S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for 
Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 Tex Tech L Rev 1 (2015). 
 9 See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 Harv L Rev 531, 
582–84 (2005); Andrew Vahid Moshirnia, Note, Separating Hard Fact from Hard Drive: A 
Solution for Plain View Doctrine in the Digital Domain, 23 Harv J L & Tech 609, 626–33 
(2010). But see David J.S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution  
of Computer Searches Conducted Pursuant to a Warrant, 105 Colum L Rev 841,  
853–61 (2005). 
 10 See Part IV.B. 
2020] Penalty Default Rules for Digital Searches 1399 
 
legislators) to act.11 Historically, default rules that penalize the 
police have been effective at causing legislatures to enact laws 
that regulate criminal procedure.12 This Comment argues that 
courts should learn from these successes and temporarily prohibit 
officers from invoking the plain view doctrine when searching a 
digital device until policymakers promulgate regulations that 
limit the scope of digital searches. 
Part I explains why the Fourth Amendment, as it has tradi-
tionally been applied to physical searches, does little to limit the 
scope of digital searches. As a result, courts have had to fashion 
new rules to limit the scope of digital searches. Part II explains 
that courts can pursue two different regulatory strategies: (1) reg-
ulating police conduct directly, or (2) trying to incentivize legisla-
tures to craft those regulations. Part III applies this framework 
to digital searches and argues that courts are trying to spur leg-
islative regulation. But, as Part IV explains, courts are not going 
about this in the most effective way; instead, courts should adopt 
a penalty default rule that better incentivizes policymakers to 
limit the scope of digital searches. 
I.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PERMITS OVERLY BROAD  
DIGITAL SEARCHES 
Today, digital devices are ubiquitous in everyday life. Be it a 
cell phone, a laptop, a smartwatch, or some other form of technol-
ogy, many Americans have a digital device on them at all times.13 
We use our devices almost constantly, and each time we do, we 
leave a small trail of data behind.14 As Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
cautioned, our data “reflect[ ] a wealth of detail about [our] famil-
ial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”15 If 
stitched together, the information on our devices can paint a very 
 
 11 See Tara Mikkilineni, Note, Constitutional Default Rules and Interbranch Coop-
eration, 82 NYU L Rev 1403, 1409–10 (2007). Hadley v Baxendale, 156 Eng Rep 145 (Ex 
1854), exemplifies the idea: the court imposed a rule that makes a party in breach of a 
contract liable for foreseeable damages only in order to incentivize the party harmed by 
the breach to disclose potential damages in contract negotiations. 
 12 See Part IV.A. 
 13 Consumers in the United States, for example, look at their smartphones an aver-
age of fifty-two times per day. See Global Mobile Consumer Survey, US Edition *2 
(Deloitte, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/CYS5-9XRU. 
 14 Consider Jacqueline Howard, Americans Devote More than Ten Hours a Day to 
Screen Time, and Growing (CNN, July 29, 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/X9E2-3LU3. 
 15 United States v Jones, 565 US 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor concurring). 
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intimate picture of our lives—and digital devices are capable of 
storing vast amounts of information. 
Searching a suspect’s computer or phone has become a rou-
tine part of many modern criminal investigations.16 But once an 
officer has a warrant to search a digital device, there are few safe-
guards that prevent officers from sifting through all of a suspect’s 
data to find something incriminating. This Part explains why 
Fourth Amendment doctrine, as it has been applied to physical 
searches, fails to appropriately limit the scope of digital searches. 
A. The Fourth Amendment Limits the Scope of Physical 
Searches 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to 
be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”17 When the 
Framers drafted this phrase, the type of search they aimed to pro-
hibit was a search pursuant to a “general warrant.” This type of 
document, widely reviled, “allowed British officers to rummage 
through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal 
activity.”18 To ensure that such general, probing searches would 
not be possible in the new republic, the Framers adopted the 
Fourth Amendment. Consistent with the Framers’ aim, courts 
have interpreted the Fourth Amendment to place limits on an of-
ficer’s ability to conduct a generalized search of a physical space. 
One way that the Fourth Amendment limits the scope of a 
physical search is by requiring an officer to obtain a warrant be-
fore beginning a search. A search is presumptively unreasonable 
if it is conducted without a warrant.19 In order for a warrant to be 
valid, it must satisfy three constitutional criteria: (1) it must be 
supported by “probable cause”; (2) it must contain an officer’s 
“[o]ath or affirmation”; and (3) it must “particularly describ[e] the 
 
 16 Consider H. Marshall Jarrett, et al, Searching and Seizing Computers and Ob-
taining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations *ix (Department of Justice, 2009), 
archived at https://perma.cc/MLW8-8FH4. 
 17 US Const Amend IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”). 
 18 Carpenter v United States, 138 S Ct 2206, 2213 (2018), quoting Riley v California, 
573 US 373, 403 (2014). 
 19 Kentucky v King, 563 US 452, 459 (2011), citing Brigham City v Stuart, 547 US 
398, 403 (2006). There are numerous exceptions to this rule, such as the exigency exception 
and the automobile exception. See Missouri v McNeely, 569 US 141, 148–49 (2013) (dis-
cussing the scope of the exigency exception); California v Acevedo, 500 US 565, 579–80 
(1991) (discussing the scope of the automobile exception). In these situations, a warrant is 
not required. However, this Comment focuses exclusively on the legal limitations on digi-
tal searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. 
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place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”20 The 
last requirement—contained in the Particularity Clause—invali-
dates warrants that either fail to specify the items that will be 
seized or provide such a general description that the warrant 
sweeps in innocuous items.21 
The Particularity Clause limits the scope of an officer’s 
search because an officer can only search for the items listed in 
the warrant. If an officer looks for items not listed in the warrant, 
the officer is conducting a warrantless search, which is presumed 
to be unconstitutional. That means that an officer can only look 
in places where the items listed in a warrant could reasonably be 
found.22 For example, an officer with a warrant to search a home 
for a stolen flat-screen television could only search in the places 
where that television would likely be found. A television cannot 
fit in a shoebox or a dresser drawer, so the officer could not open 
either container under the terms of the warrant.23 As a result, the 
description in the warrant prevents officers from using warrants 
to engage in extensive searches for incriminating evidence. 
Of course, during an otherwise lawful search, an officer may 
find incriminating evidence that is not listed in the warrant. 
When this happens, the officer is not required to turn a blind eye 
but instead can seize the evidence pursuant to the plain view doc-
trine.24 Under the plain view doctrine, an officer can only seize 
evidence if he or she: (1) sees the evidence from a place where the 
officer is legally allowed to be; (2) is able to access the evidence 
legally; and (3) immediately realizes that the evidence is incrimi-
nating.25 In other words, the plain view doctrine is “not [ ] an in-
dependent ‘exception’ to the Warrant Clause, but simply [ ] an ex-
tension of whatever the prior justification for an officer’s ‘access 
to an object’ may be.”26 Therefore, for physical searches at least, 
the plain view doctrine only applies in the limited set of 
 
 20 US Const Amend IV. 
 21 See United States v Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars and 
Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F3d 137, 149 (3d Cir 2002). 
 22 See United States v Ross, 456 US 798, 824 (1982). 
 23 See id (“[P]robable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a 
garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom.”). 
 24 See Horton v California, 496 US 128, 133 (1990). 
 25 Id at 136–37. 
 26 Texas v Brown, 460 US 730, 738–39 (1983) (Rehnquist) (plurality). 
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circumstances when an officer discovers new evidence while 
searching for the items that were specified in the warrant.27 
In sum, the Fourth Amendment has evolved over time to sig-
nificantly limit the scope of a physical search. Its Particularity 
Clause restricts what an officer can look for when conducting a 
search pursuant to a warrant, and the plain view exception was 
crafted to be a narrow exception to this rule. 
B. Fourth Amendment Doctrines Fail to Limit the Scope of 
Digital Searches 
Although Fourth Amendment doctrines limit the scope of 
physical searches, the Particularity Clause and plain view excep-
tion have failed to have the same restrictive effect for digital 
searches. An officer with a warrant to search a digital device may 
look through all the data on a computer irrespective of what the 
warrant includes and seize anything that is incriminating. This 
Section discusses three problems with the current state of the  
doctrine. 
1. The Particularity Clause does not limit the scope of 
warrants to search digital devices. 
When the Particularity Clause is applied to digital searches, 
it does little to limit where an officer can search. As discussed 
previously, the Particularity Clause limits the scope of an officer’s 
search because the officer can only search in the places where the 
evidence listed in the warrant is likely to be. But when an officer 
applies for a warrant to search a digital device, the description of 
what will be searched and seized is often general. Typically, war-
rants merely state the type of devices an officer plans to search, 
the format the digital evidence might be in (for example, a photo 
 
 27 The plain view doctrine was intended to be a narrow exception to the warrant 
requirement. Its creation was driven by practical necessity. Without the plain view doc-
trine, an officer who finds incriminating evidence that is not listed in a warrant would 
have to stop searching and leave the scene to get a second warrant. The resulting delay 
jeopardizes both the officer’s safety and the integrity of the evidence. 
  But at the same time, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement prohibits 
generalized searches for incriminating evidence. An overly broad plain view exception 
would swallow the need for a warrant. Therefore, in crafting the plain view exception, the 
Supreme Court aimed to strike a balance between a pragmatic concern about policing and 
a desire to protect the privacy of those being searched. See Coolidge v New Hampshire, 
403 US 443, 467–78 (1971) (Stewart) (plurality). 
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or text file), and what crime the evidence will help prove.28 For 
example, in United States v Mann,29 officers obtained a warrant 
that allowed them to search a home for “video tapes, CD’s or other 
digital media, computers, and the contents of said computers, 
tapes, or other electronic media, to search for images of women in 
locker rooms or other private areas.”30 
Courts allow for this level of generality because they recog-
nize that more specificity is often impossible—it is just too diffi-
cult for an officer to know in advance what the incriminating files 
will be named or where those files will be on the hard drive.31 
Even seemingly reasonable limitations (such as restricting a war-
rant in a child pornography case to only include visual media) are 
impractical. For example, if a warrant only permitted an officer 
to search for image files, a suspect could easily evade a search 
pursuant to that warrant by saving images in documents.32 Due 
to these challenges, courts consistently grant warrants to search 
an entire digital device. While courts recognize that a probing ex-
amination of every piece of data on a computer is in tension with 
the Particularity Clause, they acknowledge the practical neces-
sity of permitting such a search.33 Because digital devices are 
 
 28 See, for example, United States v Perez, 2015 WL 3498734, *1 (ED Pa) (“A warrant 
authorizing the search for and seizure of, inter alia, all ‘visual depictions’ of child pornog-
raphy ‘on whatever medium,’ and documents, emails, records, notes, and other materials 
related to child pornography, was subsequently issued.”). 
 29 592 F3d 779 (7th Cir 2010). 
 30 Id at 780–81. 
 31 See, for example, id at 782 (“The problem with . . . computer searches lies in the 
fact that such images could be nearly anywhere on the computers. . . . [C]omputer files 
may be manipulated to hide their true contents.”); United States v Hill, 459 F3d 966, 978 
(9th Cir 2006) (“Images can be hidden in all manner of files, even word processing docu-
ments and spreadsheets. Criminals will do all they can to conceal contraband, including 
the simple expedient of changing the names and extensions of files to disguise their con-
tent from the casual observer.”). 
 32 See also United States v Williams, 592 F3d 511, 522 (4th Cir 2010) (“To be effec-
tive, [a digital] search could not be limited to reviewing only the files’ designation or label-
ing, because the designation or labeling of files on a computer can easily be manipulated 
to hide their substance.”). 
 33 See, for example, United States v Upham, 168 F3d 532, 535 (1st Cir 1999) (finding 
that, “[a]s a practical matter, the seizure and subsequent off-premises search of [a] com-
puter . . . [i]s about the narrowest definable search and seizure reasonably likely to obtain 
the [evidence]”); United States v Perez, 712 F Appx 136, 139–40 (3d Cir 2017) (noting that 
courts have struggled to apply the particularity requirement to digital searches, but none-
theless upholding a search of all computer equipment found at a particular address); 
United States v Stabile, 633 F3d 219, 237 (3d Cir 2011) (discussing how broad searches of 
hard drives may be necessary to combat attempts to conceal criminal activity, but noting 
that “granting the Government a carte blanche to search every file on the hard drive im-
permissibly transforms a limited search into a general one”) (quotation marks omitted); 
1404 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1395 
 
such rich sources of evidence, courts are unwilling to conclude 
that warrants to search entire digital devices violate the Particu-
larity Clause.34 As a result, a warrant to search a digital device 
often gives an officer complete access to search everything on that 
device. 
2. Police procedures have evolved to give officers the time 
and tools to look through all the data on a digital device. 
In theory, this broad access would not pose a threat to privacy 
if police departments were searching digital devices the same way 
that they search physical spaces. But the way officers search 
physical spaces doesn’t work for digital devices. As a result, offic-
ers have adopted a different set of search protocols for digital 
searches that give officers the ability to search through all the 
data they seize. 
When officers search physical spaces, they go to the location 
listed in the warrant and search that site for evidence. For exam-
ple, the police might go to an office and stay at that office until 
they search through all the documents for evidence of tax fraud.35 
An officer cannot follow the same procedure when searching a 
computer. Computers can store billions of pages of information.36 
Reading through all that information would take weeks.37 
 
United States v Richards, 659 F3d 527, 538–40 (6th Cir 2011) (explaining that “federal 
courts have rejected most particularity challenges to warrants authorizing the seizure and 
search of entire personal or business computers”). But see United States v Galpin, 720 F3d 
436, 447–48 (2d Cir 2013) (finding that a warrant to search a digital device was overbroad 
because it allowed for the seizure of materials unrelated to the criminal offense specified 
in the warrant). 
 34 See, for example, Upham, 168 F3d at 535 (upholding a warrant that authorized 
the search of “any and all computer software and hardware” found at a particular loca-
tion); Williams, 592 F3d at 522 (stating that a computer search “must, by implication, 
authorize at least a cursory review of each file on the computer”); Mann, 592 F3d at 782–
83 (upholding a search warrant for an entire computer because the materials sought in 
the warrant “could be essentially anywhere on the computer”); Hill, 459 F3d at 973 (same); 
United States v Burgess, 576 F3d 1078, 1092–93 (10th Cir 2009) (recognizing Fourth 
Amendment concerns implicated by computer searches, but explaining that “a computer 
search may be as extensive as reasonably required to locate the items described in the 
warrant’’). 
 35 See, for example, United States v Hillyard, 677 F2d 1336, 1338–39 (9th Cir 1982) 
(describing a warrant issued in an investigation for stolen vehicles that authorized police 
to “search all motor vehicles and heavy equipment found on [defendant’s] premises”). 
 36 Ohm, Response, 97 Va L Rev Brief at 6 (cited in note 3). 
 37 See FRCrP 41(e)(2), Advisory Committee’s Notes to the 2009 Amendment (“Com-
puters and other electronic storage media commonly contain such large amounts of infor-
mation that it is often impractical for law enforcement to review all of the information 
during execution of the warrant at the search location.”). 
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As a result, police officers use a different process to search 
through digital devices. Instead of conducting the search on loca-
tion, officers make a copy of all the digital devices listed in the 
warrant and then search through the copies at the station.38 This 
process is called a two-stage search and is unique to searches of 
digital devices.39 At the station, officers will use different forensic 
search tools to find evidence that is responsive to the warrant.40 
For example, an officer may run all the files through an algorithm 
that sees if any of them match a database of innocuous and in-
criminating files.41 An officer may then use keyword searches to 
find text files that relate to the subject of the warrant.42 Or the 
officer might restore the suspect’s internet history during the rel-
evant investigatory period.43 The Fourth Amendment does not 
significantly limit how long an officer can search through a copy 
of a digital device at the police station.44 As a result, two-stage 
searches give officers a prolonged period of time to find incrimi-
nating needles in haystacks of data. 
3. The plain view doctrine, when applied to digital 
searches, is no longer a narrow exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
The plain view doctrine further expands the scope of digital 
searches by allowing officers to seize whatever they find on a com-
puter. As discussed previously, to invoke the plain view doctrine, 
officers must satisfy three conditions. They must: (1) see the evi-
dence from a place where they are legally allowed to be; (2) be 
able to access the evidence legally; and (3) immediately realize 
that the evidence is incriminating.45 Unfortunately, in the digital 
 
 38 See Jarrett, et al, Searching and Seizing Computers at *86 (cited in note 16); Kerr, 
48 Tex Tech L Rev at 6–7 (cited in note 8). 
 39 See FRCrP 41(e)(2)(B). 
 40 See Jarrett, et al, Searching and Seizing Computers at *86 (cited in note 16); Kerr, 
48 Tex Tech L Rev at 6–7 (cited in note 8). 
 41 See Kerr, 119 Harv L Rev at 546 (cited in note 9). 
 42 Id at 545–46. 
 43 Id at 542. 
 44 Because computers can store immense amounts of information, courts have been 
reluctant to limit how long an officer can spend searching for incriminating evidence on a 
digital device. See, for example, United States v Mutschelknaus, 564 F Supp 2d 1072, 1077 
(D ND 2008) (“[T]he Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require that the forensic 
analysis of computers and other electronic equipment take place within a specific time 
limit.”); United States v Burns, 2008 WL 4542990, *8 (ND Ill) (“A delay must be reasona-
ble, but there is no constitutional upper limit on reasonableness.”). 
 45 See Horton, 496 US at 136–37. 
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search context, these three conditions fail to meaningfully restrict 
the circumstances in which an officer can invoke the doctrine. 
Generally speaking, an officer is allowed to search for and 
seize only what is described in a warrant. 46  But in digital 
searches, an officer with a warrant can legally open every single 
file and examine every piece of data on a computer.47 This means 
that the officer always satisfies the first two prongs of the plain 
view doctrine: the officer is always in a place where he or she is 
legally allowed to be and is able to access the evidence legally. 
The result is that if an officer sees information that is clearly in-
criminating, he or she also satisfies the third prong and the plain 
view doctrine applies—regardless of how unrelated the infor-
mation may be to the original investigation. 
For example, if an officer with a warrant to search a computer 
for evidence of tax fraud searches for and finds child pornography, 
the officer is legally allowed to seize that evidence under the plain 
view doctrine. It does not matter that the child pornography is 
completely unrelated to tax fraud, or that evidence of tax fraud is 
likely to be found in documents whereas the evidence the officer 
found was photographic.48 Because the officer had a warrant to 
search the computer and because digital evidence can be easily 
hidden, the officer was able to look at every file on the computer 
to find the evidence described in the warrant.49 
C. Analyzing the Constitutionality of Digital Searches 
For physical searches, the Fourth Amendment’s Particularity 
Clause typically limits the scope of a search.50 But with respect to 
digital searches, these doctrines place few restrictions on an of-
ficer’s ability to look through everything on a computer. Moreo-
ver, because police search procedures have evolved, officers have 
the time to take advantage of this broad access. Police can spend 
weeks looking at a digital device for something incriminating. 
 
 46 See Marron v United States, 275 US 192, 196 (1927) (“The requirement that  
warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under 
them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing  
another.”). 
 47 See Part I.B.1. 
 48 See Horton, 496 US at 135–36. 
 49 See notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
 50 See Ross, 456 US at 824 (explaining that the permissible scope of a search is de-
fined by the “object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe 
that [the object] may be found”). 
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And, if the officer finds this evidence, he or she can seize it under 
the plain view doctrine. 
This type of generalized search creates a dilemma for courts. 
The Fourth Amendment was adopted because the Framers be-
lieved that general warrants posed a serious threat to our lib-
erty.51 Officers are not supposed to engage in “a general explora-
tory search from one object to another until something 
incriminating at last emerges.”52 Such a search violates the rights 
to privacy and property protected by the Constitution.53 But in the 
digital context, the Particularity Clause and the plain view doc-
trine appear to allow officers to do just that—officers can search 
through everything on a digital device until they find something 
incriminating. As the Second Circuit cautioned: 
Once the government has obtained [a warrant] to search [a] 
hard drive, the government may claim that the contents of 
every file it chose to open were in plain view and, therefore, 
admissible even if they implicate the defendant in a crime not 
contemplated by the warrant. There is, thus, a serious risk 
that every warrant for electronic information will become, in 
effect, a general warrant.54 
Because existing legal doctrines that have limited the scope 
of physical searches have to do the same for digital searches, 
courts have had to return to first principles to analyze the consti-
tutionality of digital searches. Under the Fourth Amendment, all 
searches are required to be reasonable.55 As discussed previously, 
a search is unreasonable if it consists of exploratory rummaging. 
In other words, a search must be narrowly tailored to find only 
the evidence specified in the warrant.56 Courts have applied this 
principle to digital searches and have found that it requires that 
“the forensic steps of the [officer’s] search process [be] reasonably 
directed at uncovering the evidence specified in the search war-
rant.” 57  In other words, a digital search violates the Fourth 
 
 51 See Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2213. 
 52 Horton, 496 US at 136, quoting Coolidge, 403 US at 466 (Stewart) (plurality). 
 53 See Carpenter, 138 S Ct at 2213. 
 54 Galpin, 720 F3d at 447 (quotation marks omitted). 
 55 US Const Amend IV. See also King, 563 US at 459 (“[T]he ultimate touchstone of 
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 56 See Coolidge, 403 US at 467 (Stewart) (plurality) (stating that the Fourth Amend-
ment requires searches to be as “limited as possible” and not include “general, exploratory 
rummaging”). 
 57 United States v Loera, 923 F3d 907, 917 (10th Cir 2019). 
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Amendment when it is not conducted in a way that tries to mini-
mize the amount of nonresponsive information viewed by offic-
ers.58 That said, this constitutional principle is relatively vague. 
It does not clearly tell an officer what he or she can and cannot do 
when conducting a digital search. Courts have attempted to fash-
ion new rules that limit the scope of digital searches, but as the 
next Part will show, direct judicial regulation of digital searches 
can only go so far. 
II.  TWO WAYS COURTS CAN APPROACH DIGITAL SEARCHES: 
FIRST- AND SECOND-ORDER REGULATIONS 
To prevent officers from engaging in unconstitutional behav-
ior, courts typically craft rules that directly dictate how officers 
should behave. This process is called first-order regulation. But 
courts sometimes issue decisions that try to spur the enactment 
of new laws that govern officer behavior.59 This second approach 
has been called second-order regulation. While first-order regula-
tion is by far the most common type of rule in Fourth Amendment 
contexts, the Supreme Court has sometimes engaged in second-
order regulation of searches.60 This Part explains the differences 
between these two regulatory approaches. Part II.A provides ex-
amples of when courts have adopted the two different approaches 
to influence law enforcement behavior. Part II.B then further ex-
plores second-order regulation by discussing the types of rules 
courts can adopt to incentivize parties to act. 
A. First- and Second-Order Regulations 
In most Fourth Amendment cases, judges issue decisions that 
directly regulate law enforcement officials.61 Courts create rules 
 
 58 See Galpin, 720 F3d at 451 (stating that a court assessing the reasonableness of a 
digital search should consider “the degree, if any, to which digital search protocols target 
information outside the scope of the valid portion of the warrant”); United States v  
Townsend, 649 F Appx 189, 191 (3d Cir 2016) (interpreting the Fourth Amendment as 
requiring the use of a search protocol that was “reasonably calculated to uncover suspect 
files while minimizing the likelihood of opening personal files unrelated to the investiga-
tion”); Loera, 923 F3d at 917 (stating that “[o]ur electronic search precedents demonstrate 
a shift . . . toward considering whether the forensic steps of the search process were rea-
sonably directed at uncovering the evidence specified in the search warrant”). See also 
United States v Rarick, 636 F Appx 911, 916 (6th Cir 2016); Mann, 592 F3d at 786; United 
States v Johnston, 789 F3d 934, 942 (9th Cir 2015). 
 59 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 209–10 (cited in note 5). 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id at 215. 
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that officers must follow when searching or seizing property. If 
officers do not comply with judge-made rules for searching and 
seizing property, a court may later conclude that evidence the of-
ficers collect is inadmissible.62 The body of judge-made rules that 
directly govern officer conduct is complex and detailed. For exam-
ple, consider the litany of restrictions that the Supreme Court has 
placed on an officer’s ability to stop and search a car. To illustrate: 
After stopping a car, an officer can search through the car if the 
officer has probable cause to believe evidence of a crime is inside.63 
The scope of the search will depend on whether the officer has 
probable cause to believe that just the trunk or the entire car con-
tains evidence of a crime.64 Alternatively, if the officer arrests the 
driver, the officer can search the passenger compartment if it is 
“reasonable to believe” it contains evidence of the crime of ar-
rest.65 Some of the rules governing automobile stops are clearer 
than others, but all the rules tell officers what to do when they 
face certain sets of facts. In other words, the defining character-
istic of a first-order regulation is that it speaks directly to officers 
in the field.66 
In lieu of directly speaking to police officers, courts will occa-
sionally issue decisions that aim to stimulate nonjudicial policy-
making.67 Scholars like Professor John Rappaport have called this 
mechanism “second-order regulation.” 68  Courts employing  
second-order regulation do not want to determine the rules that 
govern officer behavior; instead, these courts want to encourage 
the legislative or executive branches to adopt rules that are con-
sistent with constitutional principles.69 
Generally, courts choose to engage in second-order regulation 
instead of first-order regulation when judges believe that it is best 
to leave the regulatory decisions to the legislature. This often oc-
curs when courts are considering a problem that is rapidly 
 
 62 This doctrine is known as the “exclusionary rule.” See Utah v Strieff, 136 S Ct 
2056, 2061 (2016) (defining the rule as “often requir[ing] trial courts to exclude unlawfully 
seized evidence in a criminal trial”). 
 63 See California v Acevedo, 500 US 565, 579–80 (1991). 
 64 See id. 
 65 See Arizona v Gant, 556 US 332, 351 (2009). 
 66 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 215 (cited in note 5). 
 67 See id at 218. See also Mikkilineni, Note, 82 NYU L Rev at 1404–05 (cited  
in note 11) (analyzing the extent to which the Court is able to incentivize legislative  
regulation). 
 68 Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 214–15 (cited in note 5). 
 69 See id. 
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evolving or is already the subject of pending legislation.70 It can 
also occur when judges think they lack the expertise necessary to 
effectively craft rules on a subject.71 
A good illustration of second-order regulation is the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of inventory searches.72 An inventory search is 
a search that occurs after an officer has impounded a car.73 Dur-
ing such a search, the officer will catalog everything in the vehi-
cle, making note of anything valuable, illegal, or dangerous that 
is discovered. In South Dakota v Opperman,74 the Supreme Court 
held that inventory searches are constitutional if they are con-
ducted “pursuant to standard police procedures.”75 But the Court 
did not dictate what those procedures must be. Instead, the Court 
required police departments to have some standard procedure 
that was not based on individualized suspicion.76 Until police de-
partments formulated such a policy, they could not constitution-
ally conduct inventory searches. By banning inventory searches 
until police departments adopted their own standard policies, the 
Court encouraged law enforcement departments to self-regulate.77 
B. Default Rules as a Type of Second-Order Regulation 
When courts engage in second-order regulation, they often 
create default rules that regulate officer behavior until nonjudi-
cial policymakers adopt an alternative policy. These default rules 
can take two forms. First, they can be placeholder default rules 
that are feasible in the interim but which courts hope will be sup-
planted by a legislatively enacted alternative.78 Or, second, courts 
can enact a rule that makes a party worse off by default so that 
the party is motivated to act.79 This second type is called a penalty 
default rule. When courts adopt either type of default rule—
 
 70 See id at 263–64. 
 71 See id at 263. 
 72 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 221 (cited in note 5). 
 73 See Colorado v Bertine, 479 US 367, 368–69 (1987). 
 74 428 US 364 (1976). 
 75 Id at 372. 
 76 See id at 375–76. 
 77 See Bertine, 479 US at 374 (“[R]easonable police regulations relating to inventory 
procedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts 
might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a  
different procedure.”). 
 78 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 218–19 (cited in note 5); Mikkilineni, Note, 82 
NYU L Rev at 1407–08 (cited in note 11); John Ferejohn and Barry Friedman, Toward a 
Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules, 33 Fla St U L Rev 825, 850–52 (2006). 
 79 See Mikkilineni, Note, 82 NYU L Rev at 1409–10 (cited in note 11). 
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placeholder or penalty—they do so to enable legislatures to re-
place the default rules with alternative policies. 
1. Placeholder default rules. 
A placeholder default rule is a rule that police departments 
have to follow until nonjudicial policymakers adopt a constitu-
tional alternative.80 An example of this approach is the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of post-indictment lineups. In a post- 
indictment lineup, police ask a witness to identify the perpetrator 
of a crime from a group of people. In United States v Wade,81 the  
Supreme Court held that postindictment lineups were unconsti-
tutional if the suspect did not have a lawyer present to ensure the 
lineup was conducted fairly.82 While this holding created a rule 
for officers to follow, the Court stated that the rule was replacea-
ble: “[O]ther regulations, such as those of local police depart-
ments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and unintentional sug-
gestion at lineup proceedings and the impediments to meaningful 
confrontation at trial may [ ] remove the basis” for requiring coun-
sel to be present.83 In other words, the attorney requirement was 
an interim rule that police departments could replace with an-
other rule that minimizes bias in lineups. To make its point crys-
tal clear, the Court included several alternative policies sug-
gested by commentators or followed by other nations that police 
departments could adopt in the footnotes of its opinion.84 By leav-
ing the door open to other rules, the Court gave police depart-
ments the option to replace its articulated rule with alterna-
tives. 85  This facilitation of divergence is what distinguishes 
default rules from direct regulation: police are encouraged to re-
place default rules, while they are supposed to perpetually follow 
direct regulations. 
2. Penalty default rules. 
Penalty default rules make a party worse off by default to 
motivate the party to act.86 Originally conceptualized by Profes-
sors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, penalty default rules were 
 
 80 See Ferejohn and Friedman, 33 Fla St U L Rev at 850–52 (cited in note 78). 
 81 388 US 218 (1967). 
 82 See id at 237. 
 83 Id at 239. 
 84 See id at 236–37 nn 26, 29, 30. 
 85 See Ferejohn and Friedman, 33 Fla St U L Rev at 851 (cited in note 78). 
 86 See Mikkilineni, Note, 82 NYU L Rev at 1409 (cited in note 11). 
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first described in contracts.87 But in recent years, commentators 
have argued that penalty default rules can be found in constitu-
tional law as well. 88  For example, in Barker v Wingo, 89  the  
Supreme Court held that if a defendant is not given a speedy trial, 
the Sixth Amendment is violated.90 But rather than remedy the 
constitutional violation through direct regulation, the Court 
adopted a default rule that was particularly undesirable for the 
government: the indictment must be dismissed if a defendant is 
not given a speedy trial.91 Concerned that defendants who would 
otherwise be convicted would go free under Barker, Congress 
acted by passing the federal Speedy Trial Act.92 In other words, 
the Court motivated the legislature to regulate criminal proce-
dure by adopting a penalty default rule.93 
In summary, second-order regulations are judicial decisions 
that incentivize nonjudicial policymakers to regulate police con-
duct. They might prohibit a police tactic entirely as a penalty de-
fault or provide for a placeholder rule. But whatever tactic a court 
employs, the underlying purpose of a second-order regulation is 
to encourage the other branches to regulate officer behavior. The 
remainder of this Comment will show not only that courts are al-
ready using second-order regulation, but also that second-order 
regulation is a more promising tool to combat intrusive digital 
searches than first-order regulation. 
III.  THE JUDICIAL EMBRACE OF SECOND-ORDER REGULATION 
As discussed in Part I, digital searches pose unique Fourth 
Amendment challenges: police search procedures have evolved to 
enable officers to sift through vast amounts of data, while tradi-
tional legal doctrines do little to narrow the expanding scope of 
digital searches. This Part shows that courts have already em-
braced second-order regulations to address this problem. 
 
 87 See Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L J 87, 91 (1989). But see generally Eric A. Posner, 
There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 Fla St U L Rev 563 (2005). 
 88 See, for example Ferejohn and Friedman, 33 Fla St U L Rev at 846–47 (cited in 
note 78); William J. Stuntz, Of Seatbelts and Sentences, Supreme Court Justices and 
Spending Patterns—Understanding the Unraveling of American Criminal Justice, 119 
Harv L Rev F 148, 155 (2006). 
 89 407 US 514 (1972). 
 90 See id at 522. 
 91 See id. 
 92 Pub L No 93-619, 88 Stat 2076 (1975), codified at 18 USC §§ 3152–56, 3161–74. 
 93 See also Mikkilineni, Note, 82 NYU L Rev at 1411–12 (cited in note 11). 
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Part III.A describes how courts have conveyed that they are ill 
equipped to dictate how police officers should conduct searches in 
a rapidly evolving technological environment. As a result, courts 
have not been willing to directly regulate digital searches. In-
stead, courts have increasingly asked the legislative or executive 
branches to step in and craft rules for officers to follow when 
searching digital devices. To that end, Part III.B argues that 
courts have opted for second-order regulation and adopted a set 
of default rules. These rules aim to regulate digital searches  
while still giving legislators the ability to supplant the rules with 
alternatives. 
A. Courts Want Legislatures to Regulate Digital Searches 
To ensure that police conduct complies with constitutional 
principles, courts often directly regulate officer behavior.94 But 
when opportunities arise to directly regulate the way officers con-
duct digital searches, courts have explicitly refused to do so. For 
example, federal courts have consistently rejected arguments 
that warrants to search digital devices must include search pro-
tocols.95 Instead, some circuits have asked legislatures to step in 
and restrict the scope of digital searches. 
Search protocols are procedures that officers must follow 
when conducting a search.96 A search protocol may limit how long 
data can be stored or dictate the steps an officer must follow when 
conducting a search.97 In theory, search protocols limit the scope 
 
 94 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 215 (cited in note 5). 
 95 See, for example, United States v Richards, 659 F3d 527, 539 (6th Cir 2011) 
(“[G]iven the unique problem encountered in computer searches, and the practical diffi-
culties inherent in implementing [ ] search methodologies, the majority of federal courts 
have eschewed the use of a specific search protocol.”). See also, for example, United States 
v Cartier, 543 F3d 442, 447–48 (8th Cir 2008) (finding that a warrant to search a computer 
did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause despite lacking a “specific search 
strategy”); United States v Stabile, 633 F3d 219, 240 (3d Cir 2011) (same); Mann, 592 F3d 
at 785 (same); United States v Russian, 848 F3d 1239, 1245 n 1 (10th Cir 2017) (same); 
United States v Khanani, 502 F3d 1281, 1290–91 (11th Cir 2007) (same); Richards, 659 
F3d at 538 n 9 (collecting cases). While state courts also apply Fourth Amendment princi-
ples to police conduct, this Comment focuses on the approach taken by federal courts. 
 96 See Kerr, 96 Va L Rev at 1248–49 (cited in note 7). See also In re the Search of 
Premises Known as: Three Hotmail Email Accounts, 2016 WL 1239916, *2 (D Kan) (defin-
ing a search protocol as “a document submitted by the government explaining to the Court 
how it will conduct its search”); In re the Search of Apple iPhone, IMEI 013888003738427, 
31 F Supp 3d 159, 166 (DDC 2014) (stating that a search protocol is “an explanation of the 
[ ] methodology the government will use to separate what is permitted to be seized from 
what is not”). 
 97 See Kerr, 96 Va L Rev at 1249 (cited in note 7). 
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of a search in the same way that the Particularity Clause does—
by making officers declare ex ante what they are looking for and 
how they will find it.98 For a brief period, commentators thought 
that including search protocols in warrants would become the 
norm. In United States v Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc,99 the 
Ninth Circuit briefly mandated that every warrant application to 
search a digital device contain search protocols.100 However, few 
circuits elected to follow its approach.101 Even the Ninth Circuit 
ultimately backtracked: the circuit reversed its stance within a 
year, revising the opinion and relegating the controversial ap-
proach to nonbinding guidance.102 
Many courts refused to require search protocols because they 
were concerned that direct regulation would be ineffective. 103 
Courts were concerned that they would get the protocols wrong 
and thereby unduly hamper the effectiveness of law enforce-
ment.104 To be effective, a search protocol must be narrowly tai-
lored so that it limits the scope of a search. But if the protocol is 
too restrictive, it can prevent an officer from finding relevant ev-
idence hidden on a device.105 Striking the right balance is difficult 
in part because, as discussed previously, digital evidence can be 
easily disguised. 106  To make matters worse, many magistrate 
 
 98 See, for example, Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Com-
puter Data, 8 Harv J L & Tech 75, 85–89 (1994). The legal hook for this argument is that 
warrants to search digital devices are overbroad because they allow officers to search 
through lots of innocuous materials. See id at 86. One way to limit the scope of a search is 
by including search protocols that limit the way an officer can conduct the search. 
 99 579 F3d 989 (9th Cir 2009) (en banc) (CDT II). 
 100 See id at 1006–07. 
 101 Both the Third and Seventh Circuits explicitly rejected the approach, finding it ill-
advised. Stabile, 633 F3d at 241 n 16; Mann, 592 F3d at 785. Other circuits similarly ar-
rived at this conclusion, albeit less explicitly. See, for example, Richards, 659 F3d at 539; 
Cartier, 543 F3d at 447; Russian, 848 F3d at 1245 n 1; Khanani, 502 F3d at 1290. 
 102 See generally United States v Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc, 621 F3d 1162 (9th 
Cir 2010) (en banc) (CDT III). The requirement to use specific search protocols shifted 
from the lead opinion to a concurrence. See id at 1178 (Kozinski concurring). While the 
Ninth Circuit provided no official explanation for its change, the radical nature of CDT 
II’s guidance and its poor reception by other circuits immediately following the opinion 
may have contributed to the circuit’s decision. See also Untied States v Schesso, 730 F3d 
1040, 1049 (9th Cir 2013) (holding that the guidance from CDT III was only advisory and 
that warrants to search digital devices were still valid without search protocols). 
 103 See, for example, United States v Burgess, 576 F3d 1078, 1094 (10th Cir 2009) 
(“[I]t is folly for a search warrant to attempt to structure the mechanics of the search and 
a warrant imposing such limits would unduly restrict legitimate search objectives.”). 
 104 See, for example, id at 1092. See also Mann, 592 F3d at 785; Richards, 659 F3d at 
538, quoting Stabile, 633 F3d at 237. 
 105 See Kerr, 96 Va L Rev at 1249 (cited in note 7). 
 106 See Part I.B. See also Burgess, 576 F3d at 1092–93. 
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judges are less familiar with forensic search tools than police of-
ficers are.107 This lack of familiarity makes it difficult for a judge 
to know whether the search tool gives the officer access to a 
breadth of information that may or may not be responsive to the 
warrant. For example, in United States v Schlingloff,108 a district 
judge granted a motion to reconsider after learning more about 
how a digital search tool functioned.109 The judge previously be-
lieved that an officer had no ability to view the images identified 
by a search tool; however, upon discovering that the officer could 
view the images when he enabled a certain feature, the judge had 
no choice but to conclude that the officer’s search had exceeded 
the scope of the warrant.110 Moreover, when a magistrate judge 
considers a warrant application, only the government briefs the 
judge. This lack of an adversarial briefing increases the likelihood 
that a judge—unfamiliar with the details of digital searches—will 
fail to accurately assess the privacy interests at stake.111 Due to 
these challenges, circuit courts have consistently rejected pro-
posals to require warrants to include search protocols. This re-
sounding rejection of ex ante search protocols indicates courts’ 
discomfort with direct regulation. 
Courts are also hesitant to directly regulate because of the 
pace at which technology is evolving.112 Courts are keenly aware 
that any decision they make today will bind future courts. 
Changes in technologies might render any decision about digital 
searches inapposite in the future. For example, in one case about 
a digital search, the Third Circuit briefly wondered how its deci-
sion might affect the outcome of future cases that involved 
 
 107 See Kerr, 119 Harv L Rev at 575–76 (cited in note 9). 
 108 901 F Supp 2d 1101 (CD Ill 2012). 
 109 Id at 1103: 
The Court initially denied the Motion to Suppress based in part on the mistaken 
belief that the filters in the FTK system had to be applied on an all or nothing 
basis and that the agent lacked the ability to disable the portion of the KFF 
specifically alerting to known child pornography or other contraband. 
 110 See id at 1103–06. 
 111 See Russian, 848 F3d at 1245 n 1 (“[W]e note that, like other circuits, we have 
previously declined to require a search protocol for computer searches, since courts are 
better able to assess the reasonableness of search protocols . . . ‘where evidence and ex-
perts from both sides can be entertained and examined.’”). See also Kerr, 96 Va L Rev at 
1283 (cited in note 7). 
 112 See United States v Perez, 712 F Appx 136, 140 (3d Cir 2017) (expressing concern 
that emerging and evolving technologies would render its decisions about the scope of dig-
ital searches inapposite); United States v Ganias, 824 F3d 199, 219–20 (2d Cir 2016)  
(invoking the legislative history of the Wiretap Act to argue that legislators should play a 
role in regulating digital searches given the pace of technological change). 
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algorithmic searches.113 The court noted that police departments 
are increasingly using search tools (like the one officers used in 
the case) in which a computer performs the initial search so no 
human sees the evidence.114 Similarly, in CDT II, the Ninth Cir-
cuit pondered the implications that cloud computing would have 
on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.115 For example, the court 
highlighted that a warrant to search “Google’s [ ] servers to look 
for a few incriminating messages could jeopardize the privacy of 
millions.”116 Crafting rules that effectively apply to a range of rap-
idly changing technologies is like trying to hit a moving target: it 
requires a court to assess how technology interacts with prece-
dent today while also predicting how technology will evolve in the 
future. 
Given the challenges of regulating changing technologies, 
some federal courts have suggested that legislatures should play 
a more prominent role in limiting the scope of digital searches.117 
For example, in United States v Ganias,118 the Second Circuit, sit-
ting en banc, discussed the difficulties of regulating searches of 
digital devices and asked for legislative intervention: “[W]e seek 
[ ] to suggest that search and seizure of electronic media may . . . 
merit . . . legislative analysis; courts need not act alone.”119 The 
Third Circuit has also expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of 
legislative involvement in addressing these issues. It urged Con-
gress or the executive branch to step in to enact statutes that bet-
ter address the problem of the “proverbial digital haystack.”120 
While judges may be able to weigh the privacy and law en-
forcement interests at a high level, many federal courts have con-
cluded that they should not craft detailed rules telling officers 
how to conduct a digital search. Courts acknowledge that digital 
searches threaten suspects’ privacy interests. But they simply do 
not want to be in the business of telling officers what steps to fol-
low when conducting a search. As a result, many circuits have 
refused to take advantage of opportunities to directly regulate 
 
 113 Perez, 712 F Appx at 140. 
 114 See id. 
 115 See CDT II, 579 F3d at 1002. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Ganias, 824 F3d at 219 (“Statutory approaches . . . have, historically, provided one 
mechanism for safeguarding privacy interests while, at the same time, addressing the 
needs of law enforcement in the face of technological change.”). 
 118 824 F3d 199 (2d Cir 2016) (en banc). 
 119 Id at 220. 
 120 Perez, 712 F Appx at 140. 
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digital searches, preferring instead that the legislative and exec-
utive branches step in. 
B. Courts Have Adopted Default Rules to Encourage 
Legislative Action 
As the prior Section explained, some circuits believe that leg-
islators, rather than judges, are best positioned to regulate digital 
searches—and that is why courts engage in second-order regula-
tion. But to actually engage in second-order regulation, courts 
must issue decisions that legislatures can effectively supplant. 
This Section claims that courts have done just that for digital 
searches. To ensure that police officers conduct constitutional dig-
ital searches—by narrowly tailoring their searches to find only 
the evidence described in the warrant—courts have adopted var-
ious placeholder default rules. Courts have stated that digital 
searches are likely reasonable if the officer: (1) conducts a pyram-
idal search, (2) looks at nonresponsive material very briefly, and 
(3) gets a second warrant after finding incriminating evidence 
outside the scope of the original warrant. 
1. Pyramidal search process for searching a digital device. 
The Second, 121  Third, 122  Sixth, 123  Seventh, 124  Ninth, 125  and 
Tenth Circuits126 have found that a search is often reasonable if 
officers follow a high-level procedure when they search through 
digital devices. The Tenth Circuit developed this approach. The 
 
 121 See United States v Galpin, 720 F3d 436, 451 (2d Cir 2013) (instructing reviewing 
courts to consider whether an officer’s search methodology targeted folders and files out-
side the scope of the warrant). 
 122 See Stabile, 633 F3d at 239–40 (favorably discussing an officer search that began 
by indexing all the files on the computer, searching the indexed files, and only opening the 
files that were responsive to the search tools used). 
 123 See Richards, 659 F3d at 540 (finding that it is reasonable for an officer to use 
search tools to sort all the files on a computer and then examine the ones that appear to 
be the target of the warrant). 
 124 See Mann, 592 F3d at 784–85 (concluding that an officer’s use of a search program 
to sort the files on a computer was appropriate, but that the officer exceeded the scope of 
the warrant when he opened files that the program deemed were not responsive to the 
warrant). 
 125 See United States v Johnston, 789 F3d 934, 942 (9th Cir 2015) (holding that an 
officer’s search was not unreasonable when he first conducted a forensic preview to pre-
serve the data on a computer, then conducted a “bare minimum forensic scan” and used 
software to sort the files for those related to the warrant) (quotation marks omitted). 
 126 See United States v Loera, 923 F3d 907, 919 (10th Cir 2019) (finding that a search 
using a digital image preview program was reasonable because it was the best way to 
search for images). 
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Tenth Circuit wants “an officer executing a search warrant to first 
look in the most obvious places and as it becomes necessary to 
progressively move from the obvious to the obscure.”127 Said dif-
ferently, officers should start by using search tools to find files 
that clearly respond to the warrant and then broaden the search 
if the initial inquiries fail to discover evidence—following a pro-
cess that resembles a pyramid.128 By using a pyramidal search 
method, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that officers “avoid[ ] con-
ducting the kind of ‘sweeping, comprehensive search of a com-
puter’s hard drive’ that [is] prohibited.”129 
Other circuits have embraced the Tenth Circuit’s broad 
framework. They have similarly found that an officer reasonably 
targets his search by looking first at the files that most likely re-
spond to the warrant.130 In United States v Stabile,131 for example, 
the Third Circuit applied this pyramidal framework to find that 
the steps an officer followed when looking for evidence of tax 
fraud were reasonable: 
[The officer] began by physically inspecting the hard drive 
and creating a copy of the drive to ensure that the original 
drive was not damaged or corrupted during the search. Next, 
[the officer] examined the file signatures to see if any files 
had been corrupted. He then conducted a ‘hash value analy-
sis’ to see if any files had been copied. Finally, he examined 
suspicious and out-of-place folders. . . . These procedures 
demonstrate that [the officer] engaged in a focused search of 
the hard drives rather than a general search.132 
2. Time spent looking at nonresponsive files. 
Courts have also created a default rule governing how long 
officers can examine information that is unrelated to the purpose 
of the warrant. When an officer spends too much time looking for 
unrelated evidence, courts have concluded that the search was 
 
 127 Burgess, 576 F3d at 1094. 
 128 Officers should start by first analyzing “the file structure, next looking for suspi-
cious file folders, then looking for files and types of files most likely to contain the objects 
of the search by doing keyword searches.” Id. “For instance, unless specifically authorized 
by the warrant there would be little reason for officers searching for evidence of drug traf-
ficking to look at tax returns (beyond verifying [that] the folder labeled ‘2002 Tax Return’ 
actually contains tax returns and not drug files or trophy pictures).” Id. 
 129 Loera, 923 F3d at 918. 
 130 See notes 121–25. 
 131 633 F3d 219 (3d Cir 2011). 
 132 Id at 239–40. 
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unreasonable.133 To illustrate, compare two cases from the Tenth 
Circuit: United States v Carey134 and United States v Burgess.135 
In Carey, an officer found a folder of child pornography while 
searching for evidence of drug trafficking on a computer.136 After 
finding the folder, the officer spent five hours opening every im-
age to confirm that it was child pornography.137 The Tenth Circuit 
found that this was unlawful because it was clear by the length 
of time that the officer had “abandoned” his search for the evi-
dence listed in the warrant and instead had embarked on a search 
for evidence of child pornography. 138  By contrast, in Burgess, 
when an officer stumbled upon an image of child pornography, 
the officer immediately closed the file and sought a second war-
rant.139 The court distinguished this case from Carey in part by 
highlighting the difference in time spent looking at the nonre-
sponsive material: less than one minute was acceptable, but five 
hours was not.140  The Second,141  Third, 142  and Sixth Circuits 143 
have embraced a view similar to the Tenth Circuit’s. These courts 
have concluded that a digital search may be unreasonable if the 
 
 133 See, for example, Loera, 923 F3d at 919. This rule stems from the case law regu-
lating searches of filing cabinets. In Andresen v Maryland, 427 US 463 (1976), the  
Supreme Court held that when an officer searches a filing cabinet, the officer can look at 
every document in a cursory manner to see if it is responsive to the warrant. Id at 482 
n 11. Arguably, filing cabinets pose many of the same challenges that computers pose. 
Filing cabinets and computers both contain lots of files, some of which are incriminating 
and others innocuous. It is difficult to know without looking at all the files which ones are 
incriminating: the labels cannot be trusted as that would easily evade law enforcement. 
Due to these similarities, courts have applied this precedent to digital searches and ex-
trapolated that looking at nonresponsive evidence for a prolonged period of time can make 
a search unreasonable. 
 134 172 F3d 1268 (10th Cir 1999). 
 135 576 F3d 1078 (10th Cir 2009). 
 136 Carey, 172 F3d at 1270–71. 
 137 Id at 1273. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Burgess, 576 F3d at 1094–95. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See United States v Ulbricht, 858 F3d 71, 101–03 (2d Cir 2017) (finding that it was 
reasonable for an officer to “cursorily” inspect the files that were responsive to the search 
terms to see if they responded to the warrant). 
 142 See United States v Highbarger, 380 F Appx 127, 131 n 5 (3rd Cir 2010) (con-
trasting an officer’s behavior with that of the officer in Carey: the officer in this case im-
mediately closed the file after realizing that it was not responsive to the warrant instead 
of continuing to look at it for hours). 
 143 See United States v Rarick, 636 F Appx 911, 916 (6th Cir 2016) (concluding that 
an officer’s search was reasonable in part because he immediately stopped looking at the 
nonresponsive evidence after realizing that it was outside the scope of the warrant). 
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officer conducts more than a cursory examination of data unre-
lated to the warrant. 
3. Second warrant requirement. 
Finally, courts in the Third,144 Fourth,145 Sixth,146 and Seventh 
Circuits147 have considered a default rule requiring officers to ob-
tain a second warrant once they find incriminating evidence un-
related to the original warrant.148 If the officer fails to get a second 
warrant, the officer cannot expand the scope of the search to en-
compass the new evidence.149  For example, in United States v  
Rarick,150 an officer had a warrant to look for a particular video 
on a cell phone.151 Pursuant to the warrant, the officer scrolled 
through the thumbnails of photos on the phone.152 As he did so, he 
thought he saw photos that looked like child pornography but did 
not open those photos to confirm his suspicions.153 He eventually 
came across “an image of a beige wall that he thought could be 
the start of the video.”154 At this point, he opened the video file 
and soon discovered that it was child pornography.155 He immedi-
ately turned off the video, closed the phone, and obtained a second 
warrant before proceeding with the search.156 Because the officer 
stopped to get a second warrant after discovering unrelated evi-
dence, the court found that the officer did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment when he found the evidence of child pornography.157 
This rule—the second warrant requirement—often goes hand in 
 
 144  See Highbarger, 380 F Appx at 131 (finding that evidence outside the scope of a 
warrant was admissible because the officer stopped searching after discovering it and ac-
quired a second warrant). 
 145  See United States v Nasher-Alneam, 399 F Supp 3d 579, 594 (SD W Va 2019) (de-
clining to admit evidence because the government failed to obtain a second search warrant). 
 146  See United States v Lucas, 640 F3d 168, 178–80 (6th Cir 2011) (same). 
 147 See Mann, 592 F3d at 780, 786 (stating that it was “troubled” by the officer’s fail-
ure to obtain a second warrant, but upholding the search on other grounds). 
 148 See, for example, Lucas, 640 F3d at 179–80; Mann, 592 F3d at 786; Nasher- 
Alneam, 399 F Supp 3d at 594–95. But see Loera, 923 F3d at 921 (stating that officers who 
come across “evidence of incriminating, nonresponsive material” do not need to get a sec-
ond warrant to continue searching pursuant to the first warrant, but instead must navi-
gate away from the nonresponsive material). 
 149 See, for example, Lucas, 640 F3d at 178–80. 
 150 646 F Appx 911 (6th Cir 2016). 
 151 Id at 916. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Rarick, 636 F Appx at 916. 
 155 Id. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
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hand with the rule limiting the amount of time spent looking at 
nonresponsive files. If an officer finds evidence that is outside of 
the scope of the warrant, he or she should stop looking at it, and, 
if the officer wants to then use that evidence, the discovery should 
be legitimized by getting a second warrant. 
* * * 
Together, these three rules demonstrate what search prac-
tices tend to be reasonable. Some circuits (like the Tenth Circuit) 
have adopted all three of these rules. 158  Other circuits have 
adopted just one or two. But consistent across all of these circuits 
is the finding that compliance with one or all of these rules does 
not necessarily mean that a search is constitutional.159 The Tenth 
Circuit, for example, has called these rules “instructive,” and has 
emphasized that compliance with them is not dispositive.160 In 
other words, these rules are just indicia of reasonableness; there 
may be other rules that officers must follow when conducting a 
digital search in order for a search to be reasonable. Because 
these rules are not the sum total of how to judge whether a digital 
search is reasonable, they are just placeholder default rules that 
the legislatures can supplement. In fact, as demonstrated in 
Part III.A, some circuits have even expressly asked legislators to 
step in and enact policies that narrow the scope of digital 
searches. 
IV.  HOW COURTS SHOULD ENCOURAGE NONJUDICIAL 
REGULATION OF DIGITAL SEARCHES 
To induce legislators to regulate digital searches, courts have 
crafted a set of default rules that policymakers can replace with 
alternatives. This Part argues that the specific rules that court 
have adopted in the context of the Fourth Amendment have un-
dercut their calls for legislative involvement. As Part IV.A ex-
plains, courts historically have succeeded in catalyzing nonjudi-
cial policymaking when they adopted penalty default rules that 
disfavored the police. When courts disrupted favorable status quo 
 
 158 See, for example, Loera, 923 F3d at 919–20; Burgess, 576 F3d at 1095. 
 159 See, for example, Stabile, 633 F3d at 241 (stating that the application of the rea-
sonableness standard in the context of digital searches will “vary from case to case in a 
common-sense, fact-intensive manner”); Richards, 659 F3d at 538 (emphasizing that the 
application of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement will vary on a “case-
by-case basis”). 
 160 Loera, 923 F3d at 917. 
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policing practices, legislatures were spurred into action. But, as 
Part IV.B demonstrates, the default rules governing digital 
searches are not disruptive—they reflect the status quo. As a re-
sult, these rules are failing to incentivize legislative action. As 
Part IV.C explains, this outcome is problematic because legisla-
tures are better equipped to regulate rapidly changing technolo-
gies than courts are. Given the benefits of legislative action, 
Part IV.D provides a way to more effectively engage in second-
order regulation: penalty default rules. 
A. Penalty Default Rules Encourage Nonjudicial Policymaking 
As discussed in Part II, courts typically regulate officer be-
havior directly. That said, courts have occasionally tried to en-
courage legislative or executive branches to regulate officer con-
duct. These efforts at second-order regulation have not always 
been successful. But the most successful instances have some-
thing in common: courts more effectively encourage legislative ac-
tion when they adopt penalty default rules that disadvantage the 
police.161 
A quintessential example of courts using penalty default 
rules to incentivize legislative action is the legislative history of 
the Wiretap Act.162 In Berger v New York,163 the Supreme Court 
concluded that a state statutory scheme governing wiretaps vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment.164 The statutory scheme allowed of-
ficers to engage in “a series of intrusions . . . pursuant to a single 
showing of probable cause.”165 Thus, “rather than being ‘carefully 
circumscribed’ so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of pri-
vacy,” the state scheme “actually permit[ted] general searches by 
electronic devices.”166 General searches are, of course, unconstitu-
tional. In striking down the statute, the Court made it clear that 
any future legislation governing wiretaps would have to provide 
strong mechanisms to protect suspects’ privacy.167 Eavesdropping 
 
 161 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn L Rev 
349, 379 (1974) (“Under the stimulus or apprehension of constitutional decisions by the 
courts, legislatures may be moved to act.”); Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 260–61 (cited in 
note 5). See also Stuntz, 119 Harv L Rev F at 155 (cited in note 88). 
 162 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub L No 90-351, 82 Stat 
197, codified as amended at 34 USC § 10101 et seq. 
 163 388 US 41 (1967). 
 164 See id at 58–60. 
 165 Id at 59. 
 166 Id at 58. 
 167 See Berger, 388 US at 63–64. 
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could be sanctioned under the Fourth Amendment if “its use was 
‘under the most precise and discriminate circumstances.’”168 If the 
law could not be drawn narrowly, the Court cautioned that it 
would find that “the ‘fruits’ of eavesdropping devices [were] 
barred under the Amendment.”169 Fearing that law enforcement 
agencies would be unable to use wiretaps without legislative ac-
tion, Congress passed the Wiretap Act. The Act both ensured of-
ficers could utilize wiretaps in the future while providing height-
ened privacy protections for suspects.170 This win-win outcome 
can be traced to the Supreme Court’s threat to impose a default 
penalty rule.171 By threatening to adopt a rule that would signifi-
cantly hamper law enforcement, policymakers were prompted to 
legislate.172 
Default rules that do not penalize the police, however, have a 
much weaker track record of spurring nonjudicial regulation.  
Miranda v Arizona173 has the dubious reputation as being both 
the most famous example of a placeholder default rule and also a 
prime example of what not to do if a court’s goal is to incentivize 
legislative activity.174 In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that 
officers must inform suspects of their rights and do so by reciting 
a disclaimer; otherwise, a suspect’s statements are inadmissible 
in court.175 That said, the Court did not intend for the warnings to 
be permanently followed by all police departments. In its decision, 
the Court stated that Miranda warnings must be given “unless 
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons 
of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to 
exercise it.”176 The Court went on to “encourage Congress and the 
States to continue their laudable search for increasingly effective 
ways of protecting the rights of the individual while promoting 
efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.”177 In other words, the 
Court saw its holding as creating a placeholder default rule: 
 
 168 Id at 63. 
 169 Id. 
 170 See 18 USC § 2518.. 
 171 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 260–61 (cited in note 5). 
 172 See Stuntz, 119 Harv L Rev F at 155 (cited in note 88). 
 173 384 US 436 (1966). 
 174 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 260–61 (cited in note 5); Mikkilineni, Note, 82 
NYU L Rev at 1422–24 (cited in note 11). 
 175 Miranda, 384 US at 444–45. 
 176 Id at 444. 
 177 Id at 467. 
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reading suspects their rights was just one of several constitu-
tional alternatives police departments could employ.178 
Yet, to this day, no state or locality has fully replaced the  
Miranda warnings with an alternative policy.179 One reason for 
this failure was the emerging realization that, despite widespread 
fears, the warnings had no significant effect on discouraging ar-
restees from making statements to the police. 180  In fact,  
Miranda’s holding was actually quite favorable to the police: the 
warnings themselves do not discourage suspects from making in-
criminating statements, but the warnings do immunize the police 
from future Fifth Amendment challenges.181 Because Miranda’s 
default rule was one that police departments could tolerate, few 
police departments and legislatures expended political capital to 
experiment with alternatives. 
Miranda is thus an example of how placeholder default rules 
can fail to stimulate policymaking. Academics like Professor  
Rappaport argue that Miranda is indicative of a larger concern 
about placeholder default rules: if courts “implement[ ] a second-
order holding through a default rule, and the default rule is polit-
ically palatable and not obviously more costly than its alterna-
tives,” it is unlikely the default rule will lead to legislative  
action.182 In other words, politically palatable placeholder rules 
can “let politicians off the hook; once the Court weighs in, legisla-
tors can move on to other questions.”183 Penalty default rules, in 
contrast, are not politically palatable. When they disadvantage 
the police, like in Berger, they can incentivize legislative activity. 
B. Existing Digital Search Default Rules Will Not Lead to 
Legislation 
Unfortunately, the placeholder default rules courts have 
adopted to narrow the scope of digital searches is subject to the 
same pitfalls as the rules in Miranda. Default rules motivate law-
makers to act when they are politically unpalatable among key 
 
 178 See Ferejohn and Friedman, 33 Fla St U L Rev at 851–52 (cited in note 78);  
Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 224–25 (cited in note 5). 
 179 See Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 225 (cited in note 5). 
 180 See id at 259; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda’s Practical Effect: Substantial Ben-
efits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw U L Rev 500, 504–06 (1996). 
 181 See Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 Cal L Rev 673,  
744–46 (1992). 
 182 Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 258 (cited in note 5). 
 183 Id, quoting David Alan Sklansky, Killer Seatbelts and Criminal Procedure, 119 
Harv L Rev F 56, 64 (2006). 
2020] Penalty Default Rules for Digital Searches 1425 
 
constituencies like police officers. In Miranda, the default rule 
was palatable to police. So too are the default rules for digital 
searches. These rules reflect existing police practices that are pri-
vacy invasive. Because these digital search default rules do not 
interfere with the status quo, police departments feel no need to 
lobby policymakers to pass laws to change them. Policymakers 
thus are not motivated to replace the default rules with  
alternatives. 
Consider, for example, the general framework that courts 
have provided for how officers should conduct searches. As dis-
cussed in Part III.B.1, some circuits have found that a search is 
often reasonable if the officer conducts a pyramidal search: the 
officer should start by using search tools to look through the en-
tire computer for folders and files that are responsive to the war-
rant, and visually inspect only those files that respond to the 
search tools. But this general framework fails to meaningfully 
change how officers conduct digital searches. Officers already fol-
low this process. Police manuals instruct officers to first sort the 
information on the device, then use software to search for rele-
vant materials, and finally open only the materials that respond 
to the search tools.184 In other words, this default rule reflects cur-
rent police practices. Because the rule reflects the status quo, pol-
icymakers have no incentivize to replace the default rule with al-
ternatives. Police are happy with the current rule and so do not 
lobby for change. 
But this placeholder default rule is not desirable in the long 
term. While requiring officers to start their searches in the most 
obvious places is an intuitive rule, it does little to limit the scope 
of a search. If an officer fails to find evidence in the most obvious 
places, the rule allows the officer to expand the scope of the search 
to increasingly less obvious, more tangentially related folders. As 
a result, the rule does not prevent an officer from looking through 
everything on a digital device if the suspect has hidden the  
evidence well—or worse, if the suspect has committed no crimes 
at all. 
The second warrant requirement, like the pyramidal search 
rule, is another example of a default rule that will fail to incentive 
policymakers to act. It too reflects existing, privacy-invasive po-
lice practices. According to this default rule, officers must get a 
 
 184 See, for example Jarrett, et al, Searching and Seizing Computers at *86 (cited in 
note 16); INTERPOL, Global Guidelines for Digital Forensics Laboratories *42–48 (May 
2019), archived at https://perma.cc/4WZB-UU45. 
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second warrant after discovering evidence unrelated to the sub-
ject of the original warrant.185 But law enforcement agencies al-
ready provide similar guidance to officers. For example, the De-
partment of Justice recommends that officers stop searching and 
apply for a second warrant if they discover digital evidence sub-
stantially outside the scope of the original warrant.186 Because the 
second warrant requirement reflects existing police practices, it 
is not going to incentivize lawmakers to act. Police officers are 
content with the status quo and so will not feel the need to lobby 
legislatures for a change. 
The second warrant requirement also provides illusory pri-
vacy protections. This requirement only applies after an officer 
has found incriminating evidence. Because the officer found the 
evidence while conducting an otherwise lawful search, the officer 
can invoke the plain view doctrine and include the incriminating 
evidence in the application for a second warrant. When presented 
with a warrant application that includes evidence of the kind the 
warrant is for, a magistrate judge will certainly approve it. As a 
result, if an officer finds unrelated evidence, the officer will be 
able to get a second warrant and the scope of the search will in-
evitably expand. The second warrant requirement and the rule 
requiring officers to look at nonresponsive material briefly, there-
fore, do not prevent an officer from looking for incriminating evi-
dence outside the scope of the warrant. In fact, they arguably en-
courage officers to engage in generalized searches because officers 
know that if they find incriminating evidence outside the scope of 
the warrant, they just need to apply for a second warrant in order 
to legitimize its discovery. 
Unfortunately, both the pyramidal search rule and the sec-
ond warrant requirement are two placeholder default rules that 
reflect existing privacy-invasive police practices. Because these 
rules reflect the status quo, police departments are not going to 
lobby legislators to replace the placeholder default rules. Without 
that push, it is not likely that legislatures will act. Individuals 
may be concerned that their privacy interests could be infringed 
by police officers, but for most of us, this concern is small. Because 
the citizenry is a diffuse interest group, it is unlikely that this 
 
 185 See Part III.B.3. 
 186 See Jarrett, et al, Searching and Seizing Computers at *91 (cited in note 16) (“[I]t 
remains prudent to seek a second warrant upon discovering evidence of an additional 
crime not identified in the initial warrant.”). 
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small concern about digital searches will be sufficient to mobilize 
citizens to lobby policymakers for more privacy-protective rules. 
In contrast, law enforcement officials are a discrete and 
highly organized interest group. They are better positioned to suc-
cessfully lobby legislatures to change default rules. As a result, 
default rules that disadvantage the police are more likely to spur 
legislative action. But unfortunately, the placeholder rules courts 
have adopted for digital searches reflect the status quo and will 
not incentivize nonjudicial policymaking. Without the enactment 
of new laws that narrow the scope of digital searches, suspects 
will have to rely on existing Fourth Amendment doctrines—doc-
trines that provide minimal privacy protections against expan-
sive digital searches. 
C. Why the Legislature Should Regulate Digital Searches 
For the reasons discussed in the previous Section, it is un-
likely that legislatures will replace the existing digital search de-
fault rules with alternatives: they’re too politically palatable to 
motivate legislators to act. Such an outcome, however, forgoes the 
benefits of having legislatures regulate government searches of 
digital devices. 
A comparison of institutional competencies suggests that the 
legislative branch is better equipped to regulate digital searches 
than the judiciary. This is in large part due to the pace at which 
technology is currently evolving. A central conceit of our judicial 
system is that legal doctrines are established over time.187 Courts 
craft rules through the process of repeatedly hearing similar 
cases. But, as Professor Orin Kerr has argued, this process is un-
dermined when technology is changing so fast that courts cannot 
repeatedly hear the same cases. For example, the detailed body of 
rules governing car searches evolved over a period of decades.188 
Judges were able to craft these detailed rules because the under-
lying technology (cars) has not changed significantly over time.189 
By contrast, a court’s decade-old analysis of a case involving cell 
phones may already be outdated. 190  Crafting detailed direct 
 
 187 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi L Rev 
877, 888 (1996). 
 188 See Part II.A. See also Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technolo-
gies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 Mich L Rev 801, 862–83 (2004). 
 189 See id at 860–64. 
 190 See, for example, the facts of Riley v California, 573 US 373, 378–81 (2014). 
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regulations requires stability that is not present for digital  
technologies.191 
Of course, the legislature is not immune from the challenges 
posed by rapidly changing technologies: elected officials are also 
unable to predict the future. For example, the legislature failed 
to foresee the privacy risk that silent video surveillance would 
pose when Congress enacted the Wiretap Act.192 That said, the 
legislature is better equipped to regulate evolving technologies 
because it is able to regulate in an anticipatory fashion. In con-
trast, courts are required to rule on the facts before them. Due to 
the slow pace of litigation, judges are often ruling on the legiti-
macy of investigatory tactics that occurred several years in the 
past. While the delay may not matter for police tools that never 
go out of style (such as police interrogations) this delay can be 
significant when digital devices are involved. Courts of appeal are 
often crafting rules to resolve cases about old technologies. For 
example, in Riley v California,193 Chief Justice John Roberts la-
mented the fact that the focus of one of the consolidated cases be-
fore the court was on a flip phone.194 Chief Justice Roberts himself 
noted that the flip phone is functionally much more limited than 
current technology and is no longer in popular use.195 Moreover, 
while judges can anticipate future changes, they are limited in 
their ability to issue rules unrelated to the controversy before 
them.196 The legislature, in contrast, does not have these con-
straints: it is able to launch investigations into future trends and 
fashion rules in a proactive manner. 
This is not to say that courts are completely unable to devise 
flexible rules that are able to anticipate technological changes. 
Courts have done so before. In Kyllo v United States,197 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court anticipated the evolution of heat-sensing 
technology when crafting its holding. 198  But when either 
 
 191 Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 860–64 (cited in note 188) (arguing that the similar fact 
patterns that arise when technologies do not substantially change over time permit courts 
to strike the proper balance between law enforcement needs and privacy interests while 
providing clear, workable rules). 
 192 See Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Mis-
guided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 Fordham L Rev 747, 763 (2005). 
 193 573 US 353 (2014). 
 194 See id at 380. 
 195 See id at 385. 
 196 Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 868 (cited in note 188). 
 197 533 US 27 (2001). 
 198 See id at 36 (“[T]he rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems 
that are already in use or in development.”). 
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institution tries to predict the future, errors sometimes occur. Pol-
icymakers and judges may be wrong about what the future holds 
and craft rules that are poorly suited to emerging technologies. In 
the event of such an error, the legislative and executive branches 
are better able to change the rules than courts are.199 
Stare decisis binds courts’ ability to turn a new leaf when past 
approaches do not adequately solve new problems. For example, 
in the years leading up to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision 
in Riley, many courts found that a police officer could search a 
suspect’s phone incident to arrest.200 These courts reached this 
conclusion because it seemed compelled by existing precedent: an 
officer can search any “containers” found on a suspect’s person, 
and a cell phone is a container.201 But a cell phone is distinct in 
many ways from other containers (like a backpack, for example): 
cell phones contain much more information, and that information 
can be highly personal.202 Nevertheless, many circuits, recogniz-
ing the privacy interests at stake, concluded that under stare de-
cisis, they could not reach a different holding.203 As technology 
evolves, tensions will continue to build as old legal doctrines are 
applied to new problems. Due to limitations like stare decisis, 
courts are constrained in ways that legislatures are not, and thus 
are not as well positioned to regulate rapidly evolving technology 
as legislatures are. 
Legislatures have other advantages as well: they are more 
democratically accountable than courts are. As a result, they may 
be better positioned to make the difficult value trade-offs inherent 
in regulating digital searches.204 Moreover, legislatures can ex-
periment with different ways to make these trade-offs. Different 
states with varying value preferences can choose to express those 
preferences with different statutory schemes. 205  Federalism 
 
 199 See Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 807 (cited in note 188) (“Legislatures can enact com-
prehensive rules based on expert input and can update them frequently as technology 
changes.”). 
 200 See, for example, United States v Flores-Lopez, 670 F3d 803, 806 (7th Cir 2012); 
United States v Finley, 477 F3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir 2007); United States v Wurie, 612 F 
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 201 See, for example, Flores-Lopez, 670 F3d at 806. 
 202 See Riley, 573 US at 393–95. 
 203 See, for example, Flores-Lopez, 670 F3d at 806–08; Wurie, 612 F Supp 2d at 110. 
 204 See Kerr, 102 Mich L Rev at 858–60 (cited in note 188). 
 205 See generally Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply 
the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from  
Unreasonable Search, 55 Cath U L Rev 373 (2006). 
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famously creates laboratories of democracy. By contrast, varia-
tion is more of a bug than a feature of the federal judiciary: there 
is only one Fourth Amendment after all. Given the inherent un-
certainty around the future of technology and the best way to 
manage rapid change, a mechanism that facilitates experimenta-
tion may be better suited to regulate digital devices. Recognizing 
this, Justice Samuel Alito has joined lower courts in asking legis-
lators to step in and resolve Fourth Amendment questions raised 
by changing technologies: “Legislation is much preferable to the 
development of an entirely new body of Fourth Amendment 
caselaw for many reasons, including the enormous complexity of 
the subject, the need to respond to rapidly changing technology, 
and the Fourth Amendment’s limited scope.”206 
D. Salvaging the Second-Order Approach 
While it is unlikely that the courts’ current approach will mo-
tivate executive or legislative policymaking, courts should not 
abandon their commitment to second-order regulation. To incen-
tivize legislative actors to regulate digital searches, this Com-
ment argues that courts should adopt a penalty default rule. As 
discussed in Part IV.A, penalty default rules that disadvantage 
police departments have effectively catalyzed legislative action in 
the past. This Comment argues that courts should learn from 
these successes and eliminate the plain view doctrine during 
searches of digital devices until policymakers narrow the scope of 
digital searches. This Section first explains why temporarily ban-
ning the plain view doctrine is possible. It then goes on to explain 
why doing so is normatively desirable. 
1. Courts can eliminate the plain view doctrine for digital 
searches. 
Courts can eliminate the plain view doctrine in the context of 
digital searches because doing so is consistent with the rationale 
for the exception. As explained in Part I.A, when the Supreme 
Court first articulated the plain view doctrine, it made clear that 
the doctrine was intended to be a narrow exception to the warrant 
requirement. It was never supposed to enable an officer to engage 
in “a general exploratory search from one object to another until 
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something incriminating at last emerges.”207 However, because 
courts have interpreted the Particularity Clause to allow an of-
ficer with a warrant to search a digital device to look at every-
thing on that device, the plain view doctrine is no longer a narrow 
exception. Instead, it enables officers to engage in the very  
behavior that the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized is 
unconstitutional. 
A court can eliminate a judicially constructed exception that 
contributes to unconstitutional searches. The Supreme Court has 
done this before in the context of searches incident to arrest. The 
search incident to arrest doctrine is an exception to the warrant 
requirement: after an arrest, an officer is able to search a suspect 
and the suspect’s belongings. But, in Riley, the Court eliminated 
the exception in the context of cell phones.208 The Court concluded 
that allowing an officer to search a suspect’s cell phone incident 
to arrest would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment: 
cell phones contain far too much highly sensitive personal infor-
mation. Given the unique problems that digital searches pose, 
courts should similarly restrict the scope of the plain view doc-
trine and temporarily prohibit the application of the doctrine to 
searches of digital devices. 
Permanently eliminating the plain view doctrine in the con-
text of digital searches has gained some traction among scholars 
and courts. Kerr first tentatively proposed eliminating the plain 
view doctrine in 2005.209 He argued that the plain view doctrine 
should not be applicable in digital searches because it was too 
powerful a tool in the age of big data for many of the reasons dis-
cussed in Part I.B.2.210 Other commentators, taking a less abso-
lutist view, have also embraced the general principle that the 
plain view doctrine is too powerful when applied to digital 
searches as they are presently regulated.211 Then in 2009, the pro-
posal to eliminate the plain view doctrine from digital searches 
was briefly considered by a circuit court. In CDT II, the Ninth 
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Circuit, sitting en banc, endorsed Kerr’s view and required offic-
ers to “forswear reliance” on the plain view doctrine.212 While the 
circuit subsequently relegated this idea to advisory status,213 the 
legal environment in which it was embraced has not changed sig-
nificantly. Digital searches are just as broad in scope, and the 
same Fourth Amendment risks exist. 
While such a temporary ban on invoking the plain view doc-
trine in digital searches might seem radical, similar penalty de-
fault rules have been employed by the Supreme Court in the past. 
For example, in Barker v Wingo, the Supreme Court held that if 
a defendant is not given a speedy trial, the Sixth Amendment is 
violated.214 But rather than remedy the constitutional violation 
through direct regulation, the Court adopted a default rule that 
was particularly undesirable for the government: an indictment 
must be dismissed if a defendant is not given a speedy trial.215 
Concerned that defendants who would otherwise be convicted 
would go free under Barker, Congress acted by passing the federal 
Speedy Trial Act.216 The Act replaced the diffuse standard that 
Barker created with a set of rules that courts had to follow. In 
other words, the Court’s adoption of a penalty default rule moti-
vated the legislature to regulate criminal procedure.217 
Another example of a radical penalty default rule is the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Colorado v Bertine.218 In Bertine, the 
Supreme Court banned police departments from conducting in-
ventory searches until they adopted uniform policies that regu-
lated those types of searches.219 Inventory searches are very im-
portant to law enforcement: police officers need to be able to 
search cars that they impound for safety reasons as well as law 
enforcement needs. Not wanting to forgo this useful tool, police 
departments across the country ensured that they had policies 
that sufficiently restricted their inventory searches. 220  Both of 
these examples illustrate that temporarily adopting rules with 
 
 212 CDT II, 579 F3d at 998. See also id at 1006 (listing all the requirements for a 
digital search). 
 213 See generally United States v Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc, 621 F3d 1162 (9th 
Cir 2010) (CDT III). 
 214 See Barker, 407 US at 522. 
 215 See id. 
 216 See note 92 and accompanying text. 
 217 See Mikkilineni, Note, 82 NYU L Rev at 1411–12 (cited in note 11). 
 218 479 US 367 (1987). 
 219 See id at 374 n 6. 
 220 See id. See also Rappaport, 103 Cal L Rev at 221 (cited in note 5). 
2020] Penalty Default Rules for Digital Searches 1433 
 
negative law enforcement consequences to incentivize policymak-
ers to act is not as radical as it might initially seem. 
2. Eliminating the plain view doctrine for digital searches 
is desirable. 
While such decisions are rare, the Supreme Court has en-
dorsed radical approaches when the severity of the problem war-
rants it. And the problem of overbroad digital searches is one that 
certainly warrants such action.221 Unless policymakers act, a sin-
gle warrant to search our digital devices will continue to give of-
ficers access to much of the data we produce on a daily basis. And 
given our increasing reliance on digital devices, such expansive 
access poses a significant threat to both our privacy and auton-
omy interests. Therefore, while the rules that legislatures  
enact may not be perfect, they certainly will be better than the 
status quo. 
This rule—a temporary ban on using the plain view doctrine 
in digital searches—will be more effective than the existing de-
fault rules at incentivizing legislatures to act because it disrupts 
the policing status quo in a way that disadvantages law enforce-
ment interests. As discussed in Part I.B.2, the plain view doctrine 
is an extremely powerful tool that officers can wield when search-
ing digital devices. The doctrine allows officers to use any imme-
diately incriminating evidence they discover when searching a 
laptop or phone. Without it, officers would be severely circum-
scribed in their ability to benefit from incriminating evidence that 
was not listed in a warrant. Because the plain view exception is 
so central to digital searches, a rule that prevents officers from 
relying on the plain view doctrine until such searches are regu-
lated will cause police departments and their associated interest 
groups to lobby legislatures for the necessary regulation. 
Some may worry that police departments may be too effective 
at lobbying, and the resulting legislative solution will be skewed 
toward law enforcement interests. This has occurred in the past. 
A famous example is the USA PATRIOT Act.222 Following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, the Act was rushed through Congress due to 
strong lobbying from law enforcement advocates.223 It contained a 
number of controversial provisions that tried to make fighting 
 
 221 See Part I.B. 
 222 Pub L No 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001). 
 223 See Solove, 74 Fordham L Rev at 770–71 (cited in note 192). 
1434 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1395 
 
terrorism easier at the expense of privacy interests.224 However, 
the ultimate fate of the PATRIOT Act illustrates what can hap-
pen if legislation enables broad surveillance. When the public 
learned that provisions of the Act enabled the federal government 
to engage in massive surveillance of their telephone calls (known 
as the telephony metadata program), the ensuing outrage pre-
vented the program from ultimately being reauthorized. While 
other provisions of the Act were renewed, public sentiment pre-
vented the program from continuing.225 Given the ubiquity of dig-
ital devices in everyday life, it is conceivable that a regulatory 
scheme that allowed police officers to engage in generalized 
searches of digital devices would face similar widespread  
hostility. 
Furthermore, this provision does not eliminate the role of the 
federal judiciary entirely. Courts should still operate as a check 
on police practices that clearly violate the Fourth Amendment—
even those sanctioned by law.226 Under existing federal circuit 
court precedent, police officers have to reasonably tailor their 
searches to find only what is specified in the warrant.227 A regula-
tory regime that did not require police officers to tailor their 
searches in this manner would violate the Fourth Amendment. In 
this way, judicial review will act as a backstop preventing  
truly privacy-invasive policy regimes from being enacted by  
legislatures.228 
Of course, an easy response to this proposal is to point out the 
risk that the legislature will not respond to the penalty default 
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rule at all—or if they do, legislatures will take years to forge a 
compromise that can be passed into law. Such a delay would ef-
fectively mean that the temporary elimination of the plain view 
doctrine from digital searches will become a permanent ban due 
to legislative inaction. For the reasons explained in Part IV.A, 
such an outcome is unlikely. But if it does occur, there is reason 
to conclude that permanently banning the plain view doctrine is 
not as untenable of a solution as one might initially fear. 
First, banning the plain view doctrine prevents officers from 
being incentivized to conduct overly broad searches. As Kerr ar-
gues, “it would allow the police to conduct whatever search they 
needed to conduct (to ensure recovery) and then limit use of the 
evidence found (to deter abuses).”229 Furthermore, police officers 
can still rely on the independent source and inevitability doc-
trines to utilize incriminating evidence that is outside the scope 
of a warrant.230 Under these two doctrines, evidence can be admit-
ted in court when the police officer had either an independent way 
to obtain the information or when the officer would have discov-
ered the same evidence irrespective of the warrantless search.231 
While these two doctrines would not apply in every situation, they 
would at least mitigate the impact of the plain-view ban in some 
scenarios. 
CONCLUSION 
Fourth Amendment doctrine as it has been applied to physi-
cal searches is unable to manage the unique threat that digital 
searches pose to privacy. While these doctrines may adequately 
balance privacy interests against law enforcement needs in an an-
alog environment, they do not do so in a digital one. In the absence 
of effective constitutional safeguards, a warrant to search a digi-
tal device enables the police to indiscriminately rummage 
through your data for evidence of criminal activity—the exact 
harm that the Fourth Amendment was adopted to prevent.232 
To combat this problem, commentators have focused on ways 
that courts can modify existing Fourth Amendment doctrine to 
better protect our privacy interests. But few commentators have 
 
 229 Kerr, 119 Harv L Rev at 584 (cited in note 9). 
 230 See id. 
 231 See Murray v United States, 487 US 533, 536–41 (1988) (discussing the independ-
ent source doctrine); Nix v Williams, 467 US 431, 440–48 (1984) (explaining the inevitable 
discovery doctrine). 
 232 See Carpenter v United States, 138 S Ct 2206, 2213 (2018). 
1436 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:1395 
 
grappled with the reality that most courts are simply not inter-
ested in directly regulating digital searches. While courts 
acknowledge the real problems that digital searches pose, they do 
not feel well equipped to get into the minutiae of digital search 
procedures. 
Instead, courts have asked legislatures to step in and directly 
regulate digital searches. Unfortunately, this request for legisla-
tive intervention is likely to go unanswered. Judges have under-
cut their pleas for assistance by fashioning default rules that re-
flect existing privacy-invasive police practices. Because these 
rules reflect the status quo, legislators will be unlikely to expend 
the political capital necessary to replace the default rules with 
alternatives. 
To incentivize nonjudicial policymaking, courts should adopt 
a penalty default rule that is viewed as untenable by institutional 
actors. Specifically, courts should temporarily ban officers from 
invoking the plain view exception during digital searches until 
nonjudicial policymakers adopt alternative policies that narrow 
the scope of digital searches. While such an approach seems rad-
ical, it reflects the gravity of the privacy problem we face. In the 
digital age, our lives are increasingly dominated by our devices. 
In 2018, one study reported that 90 percent of the world’s data 
was created in the last two years.233 All this information is stored 
on our digital devices. Access to these devices therefore provides 
a highly intimate picture of our lives. Until we limit the ability of 
the government to search through our data, our personal privacy 
in the digital age is under threat. 
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